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REMEDYING SEGREGATED PUBLIC HOUSING IN 
METROPOLITAN BALJ'IMORE 
As a result of the actions and inactions of local government 
in the Baltimore metropolitan area, low-income public hous-
ing occupied by black families has been effectively confined 
to low-income black neighborhoods in Baltimore City, 
fostering a pattern of racial and economic segregation ·in 
the metropolitan area. The author examines the establish-
ment of this cycle and considers the judicial and local and 
federal legislative means available to break it. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areal under-
went significant demographic change during the last two decades. 
Typical of large metropolitan areas, there :was a substantial exodus 
of white families from the city to the suburban areas2 which 
The statistical data used in this article reflects conditions for the year 1970 unless 
specified otherwise. 
1. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) is a term defined by the Office 
of Management and Budget and used extensively by the Bureau of Census. 
Generally, a SMSA consists of a central city having a population exceeding 
50,000 persons and the contiguous counties if socially and economically inte-
grated with the central city. The Baltimore SMSA consists of Baltimore City 
and Carroll, Harford, Howard, Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties. See 
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAs (1967). 
2. During the decade between 1960 and 1970, the city experienced an absolute popu-
lation loss of over 30,000 persons with a net outmigration of nearly 120,000 
persons. This net outmigration was comprised of an absolute outmigration by 
whites of 150,000 persons and an absolute inmigration by nonwhites of 30,000 
persons. The suburban counties, however, experienced a population growth of 
300,000 persons, 60 percent of which was the result of net inmigration. The white 
migration from the city to the suburbs accounted for a white-nonwhite propor-
tional change during the ten year period. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS 
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan 
Areas, 1960 to 1970, Maryland, PHC(2)-22, 5 (1971). More recent population 
estimates and projections indicate that the suburban counties will continue to 
grow during the next decade at the expense of the city. See DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND POPULATION ESTIMATES 1974 AND 
PROJECTIONS TO 1980, at 11 (1975). See generally K. TAEuBER & A. 'TAEUBER, 
NEGROES IN CITIES (1965); DAVIS & DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A GEOGRAPHIC PROSPECTIVE (1975). 
As to the United States, the black population of the nation's central cities 
has increased by 3.2 million while the white population has declined by 600,000 
between 1960 and 1970. Blacks increased only in metropolitan areas while black 
populations in nonmetropolitan areas declined by more than one quarter of a 
million persons. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND 
HOUSING, General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970, 
United States Summary, PHC(2)-l, 4 (1971). 
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resulted in the city's population becoming disproportionately black3 
and disproportionately poor.' In contrast, the suburban counties 
attracted white, economically advantaged families.1I If this trend 
were to continue unabated, the city's population would be over-
whelmingly black by the year 2000.6 As whites continue to flee the 
city, the concentration of low-income families will intensify.'T A 
heavier burden is then placed on the city to provide costly services 
despite an erosion of its tax base as a result of the exodus of 
higher-income families.8 
3. The entire Baltimore SMSA has a 23.7 percent black population. It is not evenly 
distributed. The city's population is over 46 percent black, while the remainder 
of the SMSA is less than 6 percent black. The percentage black population for 
each locality in the SMSA is set forth below: 
Anne Arundel County_ 11.1% Harford County____ 8.2% 
Baltimore County____ 3.2% Howard County___ 8.1% 
Carroll COunty_____ 4.0% Baltimore City______ 46.4% 
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, Census 
Tracts, Baltimore, Md., Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, PHC(I)-19, 
Table P-l (1972). 
4. There is a disparity of median incomes between the families living in the city 
and those living in the suburban counties. See the table below for the median 
income levels for Baltimore City and each county in the SMSA. 
Anne Arundel County _ 11,474 Harford County____ 10,750 
Baltimore County____ 12,072 Howard County_____ 13,461 
Carroll County_______ 10,180 Baltimore City____ 8,814 
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Per Capita, Median 
Family Money Income, and Low Income Status in 1969 for States, Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and Counties 1970, PC(SI)-63, Table 3 (1974). 
Baltimore City also houses a greater percentage of below poverty level families: 
Anne Arundel County_ 5.7% Harford County____ 6.2% 
Baltimore COunty__ 3.5% Howard County___ 4.2% 
Carroll COunty____ 6.6% Baltimore City_____ 14.0% 
Id. 
5. See notes 2-4 supra. But see League of Women Voters of Baltimore County, 
Everybody's Got to be Someplace, I-I (Sept. 1975) [hereinafter cited as League]. 
In America, poor people have the same right as the rich to live in a slum. 
When it comes to living in the greener pastures of suburbia, however, it's 
a different story. The rich can afford to pay the price of admission there; 
the poor cannot. So the affiuent move to suburbia .•.• The poor stay where 
they "belong", in the inner city. 
L. RUBINOWITZ, Low-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN STRATEGmS 1 (1974). 
6. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RrGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 4 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as the FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT]. See also NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. 
No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as the DOUGLASS 
COMM'N REPORT]. 
7. DOUGLASS COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 6, at 5 . 
.8. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-11. 
Baltimore City Council fiscal advisor Janet Hoffman believes a most seri-
ous problem is the parasitic financial relationship which exists between 
the city and the suburbs. Testifying at an August 1970 Commission hear-
ing in Baltimore, Ms. Hoffman described the drain which commuters cause 
on city resources. Baltimore is not able to tax suburbanites who work in 
the city, yet it supports many services used by suburban dwellers. Ms. 
Hoffman cited the hospitals, stadium, zoo, art museums, and many tax-
exempt organizations - health, cultural, charitable, and religious - as 
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The low-income city dweller's outlook appears bleak. As in-
dustry and blue collar employment opportunities continue to move 
to the suburbs,9 he is left behind, facing significantly higher odds 
of being unemployed.10 
An investigation of the causes of residential segregation dis-
closes a variety of contributing factors,ll dominated by racial dis-
examples of activities which the city alone subsidizes, but which people 
from the regional area use extensively. There is no parallel benefit from 
the suburbs to the urban dweller. 
/d. at 11. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 760 n.12 (1974) ; Gautreaux 
v. Romney, 457 F2d 124, 138 (7th Cir. 1972). 
9. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 6, at 11. "[B]etween 1955 and 1965, 82 
industries relocated from Baltimore City to the surrounding suburbs, most of 
them in Baltimore County." !d. See also Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing 
Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), ajJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Hills v. 
Gautreaux,96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976). Between 1948 and 1968 jobs increased in Balti-
more City by 11 percent, but increased in the surrounding counties by 245 percent. 
Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Baltimore, Maryland, 14 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Baltimore Hearings]. 
10. The unemployment figures set forth in the table below reveal that blacks faced 
higher unemployment in most areas of the SMSA. Additionally, the table illus-
trates the unemployment problems faced by city residents. 
MALES 
Anne Arundel County ________ _ 
Baltimore County 
Carroll County _________ _ 
Harford COunty _________ _ 
Howard COunty _________ _ 
Baltimore City ___________ "'" 
FEMALES 
Percent 
Unemployed 
2.2% 
2.1% 
1.8% 
2.1% 
1.7% 
4.3% 
(Negroes) 
Percent 
Unemployed 
2.8% 
2.9% 
5.7% 
3.4% 
2.0% 
5.8% 
(Negroes) 
Percent Percent 
Unemployed Unemployed 
Anne Arundel County 3.5% 52% 
Baltimore County________ 3.4% 3.0% 
Carroll County "32% 1.3% 
Harford County 5.5% 9.5% 
Howard County 2.3% 4.4% 
Baltimore City 5.1% 6.7% 
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970' CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, Census 
Tracts, Baltimore, Md., Standard" Metropolitan Statistical Area, PHC(l)-19, 
Tables P-3, P-6 (1972). Cf. Baltimore Hearings; sUpra note 9, at 506, Exhibit 
No. 5 (Staff Report, Demographic Economics, Social and Political Charac-
teristics of Baltimore City and Baltimore County y. 
11. See, e.g., Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School Segrega-
tion,21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 83~1 (1975). In this article Professor Taeuber 
briefly analyzes the three major types of causes of" residential segregation recog-
nized by scholars: (1) economics, or the poverty "of blacks; (2) choice, or the 
" self-separation of blacks; and (3) racial discri~ruttion. ld. at 836. The argu-
ment supporting economics as a factor is based on the paucity of low and moder-
ate income housing in the suburbs concomitant with the propensity of blacks to 
be poor. Professor Taeuber poin~s out, however, that the validity of this argu-
ment has not been substantiated by complex statistical analysis. "ld. at 837. He 
also relegates the "choice" factor to a position' of dhninutive influence. I d. at 
838--39. He concludes that the prime cause of residential segregation is racial 
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crimination.12 Racial discrimination taints both the public and 
private housing markets.13 When the local Public Housing Agency 
(PHA) selects and the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) approves a public housing site located in the 
inner city, the pattern of residential segregation is reinforced. 
Conversely, selection of sites in racially mixed areas reverses this 
pattern.14 
This article focuses on the role of public housing11i in creating 
the existing pattern of segregated housing in the Baltimore metro-
politan area, and explores the affirmative methods available to 
reverse this pattern. 
discrimination. ld. at 840. See also O. DAVIS & G. DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ch. 6 (1975); K. TAEUBER & A. 
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965); Campbell & Schuman, Racial Attitudes 
in 15 American Cities, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (F. Praeger pub. 1968). 
12. Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives an Housing and School Segregation, 21 
WAYNE L. REv. 833, 840 (1975). See generally J. KAIN & 1. QUIGLEY, HOUSING 
MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1975), in which the authors conclude that 
"only a small portion of residential segregation can be attributed to socio-economic 
differences between black and white households." ld. at 90. Not only do they 
reject economics as a primary cause of residential segregation, but they intimate 
that racial discrimination in the housing market, which has inhibited black home 
ownership, is a contributing factor to black economic deprivation. ld. at 90-91. 
As does Professor Taeuber, they conclude that the major cause of residential 
segregation is racial discrimination. ld. 
13. Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives an Housing and School SegregatiOl~, 21 
WAYNE L. REv. 833, 840 (1975). See also Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measur-
ing the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterl~ of the 
Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973). This article reports the findings of a quantitative 
analysis measuring the correlation of various factors with what the authors term 
"income group clustering." It reveals a significant correlation in Baltimore 
between race and income group clustering. ld. at 507-08 (Table II, variable 
X5). The 1970 Census appears to support the proposition that race rather than 
economics is the primary factor in the creation of concentrations of low-income 
persons in Baltimore City. The analysis was stated as follows: 
Although a high proportion of the poor reside in the low-income areas, 
blacks who were above the poverty level were more likely to live in the 
area than whites who were below this level. 
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,. 1970 CE."fSUS OF POPULAnoN, Low-Income Neighbor-
hoods in Large Cities: 1970, Baltimore, Md., PC(SI)-66, ii (1974). For a 
discussion of racial discrimination in the private housing market, see Comment, 
Racial Discrimination in the Private Housil'1l Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. 
L. REv. 289 (1973). 
14. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Maxwell, HUD's 
Project Selection Criteria - A Cure for "Impermissible Color Blindness"', 
48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1972). 
15. Public housing as used herein refers to federal housing programs which are 
derived from the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 
(1937), as amended. The programs are generally labeled by their correspond-
ing section of the 1937 Act. For example, the housing assistance program cor-
responds with Section 8 of the 1937 Act. See DOUGLASS COMM'N REPORT, supra 
note 6, ch. 3. See also Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 
54 CALIF. L. REv. 642 (1966). The public housing programs for the elderly and 
handicapped are not discussed in this article. 
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II. PUBLIC HOUSING AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The lower-income black tenants of public housing in Baltimore 
City are victimized by a form of two-tiered racial discrimination. 
First, the suburban areas surrounding the city, especially Baltimore 
County, effectively exclude lower-income blacks.16 Second, the only 
housing affordable by the poor - public housing in the city -
subjects blacks to discrimination in site selection and tenant assign-
ment.H 
A. Exclusion from the Suburbs 
A variety of factors has resulted in the exclusion of blacks and 
the poor from metropolitan suburban areas. IS These factors in-
clude zoning and subdivision regulations, housing and building 
codes, private restrictive covenants and the personal prejudice of 
suburban residents.19 
By policies of action and inaction, Baltimore County has effectu-
ated the exclusion of low-income blacks from its housing market.20 
Baltimore County has employed all of the traditional land use con-
trols such as zoning, building codes, building permit regulations 
and subdivision regulations that result in housing that is beyond 
the means of low-income individuals.21 For example, county zoning 
laws have not only been employed as a shield to exclude lower-
income blacks, but also as a sword to uproot and eliminate black 
suburban enclaves.22 
16. See, e.g., Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 701, (Exhibit No. 15, Rabin. The 
Effect of Development Control on Housing Opportunities for Black Households 
in Baltimore County, Maryland). See generally FLEMMING COMM'N REPoRT, 
supra note 6, at 29-32. See also note 25 infra. 
17. See text accompanying notes 37-50 infra. 
18. See Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use 
Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85 (1973). 
See also O. DAVIS & G. DONALDSON, BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES: A GEO-
GRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 140, 145 (1975). 
19. See Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use 
Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85 
(1973). 
20. Cf. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 486 (closing statement of Chairman 
Hesburgh). 
21. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 681 (Staff Report, Land Use Control in 
Relation to Racial and Economic Integration). These land use controls, result-
ing from county council ;I.ction, "have created a maj or obstacle to racial and 
economic integration in Baltimore County." Id. at 275 (testimony of David 
Hunter, Staff Attorney, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). 
22. FLEMMING CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31. An urban planning consultant 
testified to two specific examples of the use of zoning controls to displace blacks. 
First, in an area of Dundalk known as Turner Station, a black neighborhood of 
approximately 600 homes was rezoned industrial and the homes destroyed. A 
pocket of white residences in the middle of this area retained its residential 
zoning. Second, a black residential area of Towson known as Sandy Bottom no 
longer exists because a threat of commercial zoning caused the landlords to sell 
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Unlike the other suburban counties, Baltimore County has not 
created a Public Housing Agency. Until recently, the county was 
devoid of public housing programs23 despite the assertion by public 
interest groups of a prodigious need for such programs.24 Balti-· 
more County has rejected the city's offers to assist in the organiza-
tion of a housing program in the county.25 County officials have-
repeatedly asserted their confidence in the private market's ability 
to supply lower-income housing as justification for their failure to. 
instigate public housing programs.26 Although the private housing-
market in the county flourished,27 many lower-income residents 
were forced to migrate to the city to secure affordable housing.2s 
Other actions by Baltimore County have contributed to the con-
tinuing unavailability of lower-income housing in the county. For 
example, in 1968, Baltimore County applied to HUD for a grant to 
finance the writing of a water and sewer master plan pursuant to 
federal legislation which funds such activity.29 Upon learning that 
the applicable section of the law had been amended to require a 
program pertaining to lower-income and minority housing needs, 
the county promptly withdrew its application.30 After hearing 
testimony relating to the above policies and events, Chairman 
Hesburgh of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights remarked: 
In a variety of contexts we heard testimony during these 
three days that white residents of Baltimore County want 
homes occupied by black tenants. Accord, Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 
279-80 (testimony of Yale Rabin, Planning Consultant, U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). 
23. A real estate firm has been subcontracted by the State of Maryland to administer 
a Section 8 housing assistance program in Baltimore County. It has been allo-
cated funds to finance between 410 and 710 units. League, note 5 supra, at III-7. 
For an explanation of Section 8 housing, see text accompanying notes 140-44 
infra. 
24. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 742. The League of Women Voters of 
Baltimore County, Baltimore County Community Action Agency, and Baltimore 
Neighborhoods, Inc., among other groups, have stressed the need for lower-income 
housing in Baltimore County. See generally League, supra note 5. 
25. See Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 76-78 (testimony of Robert C. Embry, 
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development). 
26. !d. at 393 (testimony of Dale Anderson, Baltimore County Executive). 
27. Between 1960 and 1968, the number of housing units in Baltimore City increased 
by only 2,345 units. During the same period of time, there was an increase in 
Baltimore County of 40,551 housing units. ld. at 513. 
28. ld. at 517 citing League of Women Voters of Baltimore County, Report of the 
Housing Workshop 12 (1968). Many of the lower-income county residents who 
were forced to migrate to the city eventually were housed in the city's public 
housing projects. ld. Due to insufficient public housing to satisfy the needs of 
city residents, HCD offered assistance to the county to organize a public housing 
program in an attempt to deter the influx of lower-income persons into the city. 
The county was unresponsive. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
29. Housing Act of 1954 § 701, 40 U.S.c. § 461 (1970). 
30. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 736 (Staff Report, HUD Programs and 
Activity in Baltimore City and County). 
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to keep their county the way it is. It is as though they have 
built an island fortress where strangers, and in this con-
text it's impossible not to read the word "strangers" to 
mean poor and blacks, where they are not welcome.81 
143 
Judicial challenge to exclusion of low-income residents from 
suburban areas is difficult at best, primarily because the exclusion 
occurs through laws and pOlicies which are ostensibly neutral.S2 
The laws seem neutral due to their stated goals of protection of 
health, reduction of pressure on local services, enhancement of the 
physical environment and preservation of property values.ss Re-
gardless, the result is the exclusion of low-income residents.s4 This 
is not to say that the issue has not been litigated, but the cases do 
not provide definitive guidelines for judicial challenge to suburban 
segregated housing.35 On the other hand, judicial challenge to the 
31. Id. at 486. 
32. See generally Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: 
Land Use Control and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L,J. 
483 (1973). 
33. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and 
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969). 
34. Id. 
3S. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (city of Rochester taxpayers 
lacked standing to assert claim that zoning laws of the suburban town of Penfield 
excluded persons of low income); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) 
(upholding constitutionality of state requirement of local referendum for lower-
income housing projects); Citizens' Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 
F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (city's failure to 
fund a lower-income project upheld in the absence of a racially discriminatory 
intent) ; Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (con-
stitutionality of large-lot zoning ordinance upheld); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 
419 U.S. 1108 (1975) (constitutionality of the consent and cooperation agreement 
upheld); Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730, rev'd mem., 506 F.2d 
1400 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975) (black and 
white plaintiffs were unable to challenge city's ordinance excluding low-rent 
housing projects unless approved by referendum because context was not a 
justiciable controversy); with Metropolitan H.D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington 
Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. granted, 95 S. Ct. 560 (1976) 
(city's failure to rezone piece of property to permit low and moderate-income 
housing development held unconstitutional); United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), ceri. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (city's 
ordinance prohibiting multi-family dwelling discriminates against blacks in vio-
lation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1968); United Farmworkers of Fla. 
Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(city's failure to extend water and sewage services had racially discriminatory 
effect); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (two non-profit corporations developing federally assisted housing 
had standing to challenge exclusionary effects of city's ordinance); Kennedy 
Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), 
cerl. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (withholding building permits for a low and 
moderate-income housing subdivision held to violate the equal protection clause) ; 
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (city's zoning decision 
blocking the development of a low and moderate-income subdivision held to 
violate the fourteenth amendment). See also Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
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type of racial discrimination fostered by the city in site selection 
of public housing and tenant assignment has succeeded in recent 
years.36 
B. Discrimination by the City 
The first public housing law was passed by Congress in 1937P 
and shortly thereafter the Baltimore Housing Authority was cre-
ated.s8 During the early years of development, public housing 
projects were operated on a racially segregative basis in Balti-
more.S9 With the passage of time and the concomitant demographic 
transformation of the inner city from white to nonwhite, some 
projects originally located in predominantly white neighborhoods 
now appertain to black neighborhoods.40 Both the originally segre-
gative basis and the transformation of neighborhoods contributed 
to the current concentration of public housing in black neighbor-
hoods. 
Urban renewal programs also contributed to the concentration 
of public housing in black neighborhoods due to the requirement41 
that new units be constructed in the same neighborhood where 
deteriorating units were destroyed.42 Since the urban renewal 
areas43 were predominantly black, reconstruction in black-popu-
lated areas resulted. Also, as in other cities, black residents dis-
placed by urban renewal programs were relocated within the same 
County v. De Graff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973) 
(ordinance requiring subdivision builders to allocate specific percentage of units to 
low and moderate-income housing held unconstitutional). 
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court declared that zoning laws were immune 
from constitutional attack unless they failed to relate to the public welfare, 
morals, safety, or general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
36. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Banks v. Perk, 341 F. 
Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 
1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 
1969). But see Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Miami, 251 F. 
Supp.121 (S.D. Fla. 1966). 
37. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). 
38. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, § 1 (1966). 
39. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Fourth Report 10 (1945). In this report 
by a city agency, housing projects are identified by race. See also E. Ash, The 
Baltimore Story 2 (Dec. 9, 1955), where the Director of Management of the 
Housing Authority of Baltimore outlines the procedures to be taken to convert 
from segregative to integrated housing practices in Baltimore City. 
40. Interview with Robert C. Embry, Commissioner, Department of Housing and 
Community Development, in Baltimore, Sept. 23, 1976 [hereinafter cited as 
Embry Interview]. 
41. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 105 (c), 63 Stat. 416 (1949), as amended, 
42 U.S.c. § 1455(c) (1970). 
42. ld. 
43. See BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, §§ 34-51 (1966), for a description of where 
the urban renewal areas were located. 
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neighborhood.44 Prior to 1968, the Baltimore City Department of 
Housing and Community Development (HCD) made little or no 
effort to offer relocation housing in racially mixed or predomina-ntly 
white areas to displaced blacks.45 
The public housing program in Baltimore City has been and 
is racially segregated.46 The sites selected for public housing and 
the tenant assignment to individual projects demonstrate the de-
gree of segregation. Of the twenty-two public housing projects 
existing in 1970, only four were located in neighborhoods where 
the nonwhite population did not exceed sixty percent.47 Three of the 
four projects located in white neighborhoods were populated over-
whelmingly by white tenants.48 These three projects were the only 
ones with significant white populations.49 Ten of the remaining 
eighteen projects were located in neighborhoods where the non-
white population exceeded ninety-five percent.50 Indeed, a strong 
correlation existed and continues to exist between the racial com-
position of the tenant population and the racial composition of the 
neighborhood in which the project is located.51 Although 1976 
data for the racial composition of neighborhoods is unavailable, 
the tenant composition statistics continue to reveal a high degree 
of segregation.52 It seems unlikely, however, that the neighborhoods 
have changed in any significant manner in the past six years. 
At a minimum, a de facto segregative condition exists in the 
public housing program in Baltimore.53 In Banks v. p,erk,54 suit 
was brought against the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Au-
thority (CMHA), located in Ohio, seeking, inter alia, a declaration 
that CMHA's site selection practice was racially discriminatory, 
44. Cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
45. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 79-80 (testimony of Robert C. Embry, 
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development). 
46. This is not to say that it is being operated on a discriminatory basis. The present 
segregation of public housing is due more to the vestiges of past discriminatory 
actions. 
47. See Appendix A (App. A) and Appendix B (App. B) for a listing of the 
projects and the percentages of white and nonwhite population in each project. 
App. A lists figures for the year 1970, App. B lists figures for 1976. The census 
tract data for the percentage of nonwhite population in all of the neighborhoods 
is not available for 1976. 
48. See App. A. 
49. ld. 
50. ld. 
51. ld. 
52. See App. B. 
53. See Apps. A and B. The overwhelmingly one-race character of the projects 
evidences segregation, all that is needed for a de facto condition to exist. 
[D]e facto segregation is a condition created by factors apart from the 
conscious activity of government and de jure segregation [is] caused or 
maintained by state action. 
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 1975). 
54. 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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and violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 
In assessing whether the continued maintenance of a segregated 
public housing system violated the fourteenth amendment, the 
court found that such de facto segregation warranted relief. 55 The 
court held that CMHA was charged with an affirmative duty to 
integrate the public housing in the city. 56 The factual pattern pre-
sented to the court in Banks is very similar to the pattern found in 
Baltimore.57 
The Supreme Court, however, still refuses to discard the de 
facto - de jure distinction.58 The question arising in any segre-
gation suit is what proof meets the burden of showing de jure 
segregation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Hart 
'V. Community School Board of Education :59 
A finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions 
taken, coupled with omissions made, by governmental au-
thorities which have the natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of causing educational segregation. To say that 
the foreseeable must be shown to have been actually fore-
seen would invite a standard almost impossible of proof 
save by admissions. eo 
Notwithstanding the indication in Banks that de facto segre-
gation in public housing may be constitutional in magnitude, evi-
dence of ,de jure segregation exists in the Baltimore City public 
housing program. As previously mentioned, at its inception the pub-
lic housing program was operated on a racially segregative basis.lll 
Also, the administration of the urban renewal programs aggra-
vated the condition.62 However, the governmental actions evi-
dencing most clearly de jure segregation occurred in 1966, when 
the Baltimore City Council passed a resolution confining Section 
55. Id. at 1184-85. 
56. Id. 
57. In both cities, the housing authorities did not impose tenant quotas, site location 
was not cleared in advance with the councilman for the district, projects were 
erected in white areas and neighborhood shifts caused projects originally built 
in white neighborhoods to now be located in black areas. The situation in Banks 
and in Baltimore differ from the factual pattern presented the court in the case 
of Gautreau~ v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969). 
See Section III (A) infra. 
58. Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 129 (1973). Despite a vigorous argu-
ment by Justice PowelI, the Court refused to abandon the de facto - de jUre 
distinction. The Court did adopt a principle by which school authorities found 
to be guilty of de jure segregation in one segment of the district had the burden 
of showing that de facto segregation existing in another segment was not 
caused by their actions. 
59. 512 F2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). 
60. /d. at 50. 
61. See note 39 supra. 
62. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra. 
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23 leased housing programs63 to urban renewal areas.64 Since 
urban renewal areas were mostly black, the resolution served to 
restrict this program to black areas, which effectively terminated 
the program in Baltimore City altogether.65 
The site selection of public housing also provides evidence of 
de jure segregation. Between 1960 and 1970, the Baltimore Hous-
ing Authority (BCD's predecessor) proposed twenty-one project 
sites to the city council, eighteen of which were in black neighbor-
hoods.66 
Using the Hart tests,67 actions such as the above by govern-
mental authority constitute de jure segregation, having the natural 
and foreseeable consequence of causing segregation in public hous-
ing in Baltimore.68 It is this type of governmental discrimination, 
constitutional in magnitude, which invokes metropolitan relief.69 
63. The Section 23 program was added to the United States Housing Act of 1937 
by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 451 
(1965). Pursuant to this program the PHA leases vacant dwelling units from 
private owners and subleases them to low-income families. 
64. See BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 13, §§ 34-51 (1966). 
65. Embry Interview, supra note 40. 
66. Comment, Public Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 CoLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 253, 261 (1970). 
67. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) involved 
school segregation rather than housing discrimination. The standards employed 
to determine whether segregation, either de jure or de facto, exists should be 
the same, however, since both problems intertwine and fall within the purview 
of the fourteenth amendment. Also, in Hills v. Gautreau~, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976), 
the Court cited school desegregation cases in its analysis of a housing desegre-
gation problem. Moreover, the Federal District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia has noted: 
For better or worse, both by legislative act and judicial decision, this nation 
is committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing. Among 
other things, this reflects the recognition that in the area of public housing 
local authorities can no more confine low-income blacks to a compacted and 
concentrated area than they can confine their children to segregated schools. 
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp.382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F2d 788 (5th Cir. 
1972) (citations omitted). . 
68. ct. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), where the court concluded: 
Possibly before 1964 the administrator of the federal housing programs 
could ... remain blind to the very real effect that racial concentration has 
had in the development of urban blight. Today such color blindness is 
impermissible. 
[d. at 820. In Gautreau~ v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 
Ill. 1969), Judge Austin remarked: 
[T]his court ruled that "plaintiffs as present and future users of the system 
have the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected 
without regard to the racial composition of either the surrounding neigh-
borhoods or of the projects themselves." The statistics on the family hous-
ing site ... show a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites 
were vetoed on the basis of racial composition of the site neighborhood. 
[d. at 913 (citation omitted). 
69. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976), discussed infra Section IlIA. 
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III. METROPOLITAN RELIEF 
The Supreme Court has declared that "the command of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that no 'State' shan deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."7o A cor-
onary to this principle is that states cannot escape their obligations 
under this amendment by delegating state functions to local gov-
ernments.71 Once it is found that a state or local subdivision 
thereof has violated the Constitution, then "the court has not 
merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so 
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past, 
as well as bar like discrimination in the future."72 In formulating 
such a decree, the district courts are to be guided by traditional 
principles of equity.73 While the scope of the district court's 
equitable powers are broad, prior cases counsel that "judicial 
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional vio-
Iation."74 When state policies foster segregation, equal protection 
is denied.75 
Until the Supreme Court announced its decision in Milliken v. 
Bradley,76 the law was clear that municipal boundaries could be 
crossed when necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.77 In 
Milliken, the district court, after finding that the Detroit Board 
of Education had created and perpetuated racial segregation in the 
city's schools, appointed a panel to submit a desegregation plan 
which would encompass Detroit plus fifty-three suburban school 
districts.78 The suburban school districts were to be incorporated 
into the proposed plan despite the absence of proof that they had 
committed acts of de jure segregation.79 The Supreme Court held 
their inclusion impermissible: 
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school 
districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate 
70. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). 
71. Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.n. La. 1961), 
aff'd per curiam, 388 U.S. 515 (1962). 
72. Louisiana v. United States, 368 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). 
The objective today remains to eliminate .•• all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation. • • . That was the basis for the holding in Green that school 
authorities are "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever 
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), quoting 
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
73. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971). 
74. [d. at 15-16. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974). 
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 495 (1954). 
76. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
77. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
78. 418 U.S. at 733. 
79. [d. 
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units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district 
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a con-
stitutional violation within one district that produces a 
significant segregative effect in another district.so 
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The Court elaborated further that "without an inter-district viola-
tion and inter-district effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling 
for an inter-district remedy."sl It was against the backdrop of this 
scenario that Hills v. Gautreaux82 was decided by the Supreme 
Court. 
A. Hills v. Gautreaux 
The Gautreaux case originated in 1966, when black tenants of 
and applicants for public housing in the city of Chicago instituted 
separate class actions in federal district court against the Chicago 
Housing Authority (CHA)83 and HUD,S4 charging them with in-
tentionally maintaining an existing pattern of residential segrega-
tion through tenant assignment and site selection procedures, in vio-
lation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The district court 
stayed the action against HUD pending the outcome of the action 
against CHA.85 After finding that CHA had unconstitutionally 
discriminated on the basis of race in site selection and tenant 
assignment, the court granted summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs.86 CHA was ordered to "affirmatively administer its public 
housing system .•. to the end of disestablishing the segregated 
public housing system which has resulted from CHA's unconstitu-
tional ... procedures ... and use its best efforts to increase the 
supply of Dwelling Units as rapidly as possible .... "81 
The case against CHA then receded into the background as 
the district court focused its attention on the action against HUD. 
80. ld. at 744-45. In Milliken, the Court noted that an inter-district violation also 
warrants an inter-district remedy. !d. at 745, 755. 
81. ld. at 745. 
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional vio-
lation calling for inter-district relief, but, the notion that school district 
lines may be casually ignored or treated as mere administrative conveni-
ence is contrary to the history of public education in our country. 
ld. at 741. 
82. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). 
83. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
84. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). 
85. ld. at 753. 
86. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. 111. 1969). 
87. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Ill. 
1969). Over a year expired without the submission by CRA of proposed new 
housing sites. In an unreported decision the district court modified the 1969 order 
to require submission by CHA of sites for 1500 new units. The modified order 
was appealed and affirmed. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 
306,308-11 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). 
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The court dismissed all four counts of the suit against HUD.88 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs.s9 On remand, the district court granted 
summary judgment against HUD, consolidated the cases, and en-
tered an order requiring the parties to propose remedial plans.90 
HUD proposed, and the district court accepted, a remedial plan 
confined to the municipal boundaries of the city of Chicago.91 The 
plaintiffs, whose request for a metropolitan plan order was re-
jected,92 appealed the court's finding that metropolitan relief was 
unwarranted because "the wrongs were committed solely within 
the limits of Chicago and solely against residents of the City."93 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for adoption 
of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan.9! The Seventh Circuit 
interpreted Milliken to hold that the equitable factors in that case 
disfavored a metropolitan plan because of the administrative com-
plexities of school district consolidation and because of the deeply 
rooted tradition of local government control of public schools.95 
The court noted that "the equitable factors which prevented metro-
politan relief in Milliken v. Bradley are simply not present here."96 
Contending that the Milliken decision barred the implementa-
tion of any metropolitan area plan, HUD obtained review by the 
88. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1971). 
89. ld. at 740. While this case was pending, plaintiffs sought an injunction against 
HUD's grant of Model Cities funds to Chicago until CRA had submitted hous-
ing sites to the city council for approval. The injunction was granted by the 
district court, but overturned on appeal. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.Zd 124 
(7th Cir. 1972). 
90. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 
1973), rev'd, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1558 (1976). 
91. ld. 
92. The plaintiff's motion asked the court to consider a metropolitan plan similar to 
the one which had been affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in Bradley v. Milliken, 
484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), a case dealing with racial segregation in the Detroit 
city schools. Ironically, the Bradley plan was reversed by the Supreme Court, 
while the Gautreauz plan was affirmed. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974), rev'g 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). 
93. 363 F. Supp. at 690-91. 
94. 503 F.Zd at 939. For the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in distinguishing Milliken, 
see note 96 infra and accompanying text. An excellent outline of the GautrealU" 
cases can be found in Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation after 
Milliken v. Bradley; The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. 
U.L. REv. 633 (1975); see also Note, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing 
Site Selection and the Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330 
(1974); Comment, Of Courts and Coercion: Enjoinillg Federal Funding to 
Eliminate Segregation of Public Housing, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1283 (1973); 
Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1172 (1969); 83 RARV. L. REv. 1441 (1970); 
17 ST. LoUIS U.L.]. 395 (1973). 
95. 503 F 2d at 935-36. 
96. ld. at 936. The court further observed that there was "no deeply rooted tra-
dition of local control of public housing; rather, public housing is a fairly super-
vised program with early roots in the federal statute." Id. 
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Supreme Court. It asserted two reasons why a remedy extending 
beyond the boundaries of Chicago should not be granted. First, 
the grant of a metropolitan area-wide order would be incommen-
surate with the constitutional violation to be remediedP Second, 
the decree would have the effect of restructuring governmental 
units not implicated in RUD's or CHA's violations.9B The Supreme 
Court considered and rejected both of these contentions seriatim. 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Court interpreted Milliken to hold 
the metropolitan area-wide order in that case impermissible, 
not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer ex-
tending beyond the city in which the violation had occurred 
but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructur-
ing the operation of local governmental entities that were 
not implicated in any constitutional violation.90 
The Court noted a critical distinction between HUD in Gautreaux 
and the suburban school districts restructured by the Milliken 
order. HUD had violated the Constitution whereas the suburban 
school districts had not been implicated in any acts of de jure 
segregation.loo Milliken, it stated, was not a per se rule proscrib-
ing remedial orders which extend beyond the geographic boundaries 
of the city where the violation occurred.lOl 
The Court believed that the more substantial issue before it 
was whether a metropolitan remedial order would, as a matter of 
law, require interference with the operations of local governments 
not implicated in HUD's unconstitutional conduct.1°z In deciding 
that such interference was not the inevitable result of a metro-
politan order, the Court reasoned that a federal court possesses 
the ability to formulate a remedial plan providing the constitu-
tional relief warranted while simultaneously adhering to the limi-
tations on judicial power established in Milliken.los The Court 
observed that recent public housing legislation vested HUD with 
the authority to contract directly with private owners and de-
velopers without an intermediary public housing agency.l04 There-
97. 96 S. Ct. at 1546. 
98. !d. 
99. [d. at 1545. 
100. [d. at 1546. 
101. [d. at 1547. The Court stated that it was "entirely appropriate and consistent 
with Milliken to order CHA and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives 
for those [plaintiffs] in the Chicago suburbs." [d. The Court observed that the en-
tire metropolitan area was relevant for purposes of plaintiffs' housing options. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 1548. 
104. The Court is alluding to the new Section 8 program enacted by the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 1437£ (Supp. 1976). 
See note 138 infra and accompanying text. 
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fore, within the framework of existing legislation, HUD, by the 
exercise of discretion in the selection of housing proposals and 
through direct contractual arrangements with private owners, was 
capable of providing relief to the members of the plaintiffs' class 
without diminishing the role of the local governments in the federal 
housing programs.105 
The Supreme Court noted the emphasis which Congress had 
placed on locating housing so as to avoid undue concentrations of 
lower-income persons and to promote diverse housing opportun-
ities.lo6 "An order directed solely to HUD," the Court reasoned, 
"would not force unwilling localities to apply for assistance under 
these programs but would merely reenforce the regulations guiding 
HUD's determination of which of the locally authorized projects 
to assist with federal fundS."lo7 Projects would not be built with-
out the localities' consent except as provided by statute, and land 
use controls would remain in force. los Satisfied that the limitations 
implied in its opinion would protect the suburban localities from 
undue interference by the federal government, the Court affirmed 
the decision of the Seventh Circuit, remanding the case for the 
consideration of a metropolitan area-wide remedial plan.109 
105. From the phraseology used in this opinion it is apparent that the Supreme Court 
envisioned something akin to a "best efforts" order rather than an order which 
would impose upon HUD a specific unit production quota. 
106. See 42 U.S.c. § 5301 (b) (Supp. 1976) : 
The Congress further finds and declares that the future welfare of the 
Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on the establishment and 
maintenance of viable urban communities as social, economic and political 
entities .... 
and id. § 5301 (c)(6) : 
The primary objective of this chapter is the development of viable 
urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living en-
vironment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons 
of low and moderate income. Consistent with this primary objective, the 
Federal assistance provided in this chapter is for the support of com-
munity development activities which are directed toward the following 
specific objectives- ... 
The reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities 
and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity 
and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of hous-
ing opportunities for persons of lower income and the revitalization of 
deteriorating or deteriorated neighborhoods to attract persons of higher 
incomes .... 
107. 96 S. Ct. at 1549. 
108. Stripped to its essentials, this opinion merely instructs HUD to use its pre-
existing statutory authority in a manner which will afford the plaintiffs the 
greatest degree of relief. The opinion's vitality is derived, nonetheless, from its 
recognition that the entire metropolitan area for the purposes of housing programs 
and options is a single integrated unit. 
109. 96 S. Ct. at 1550. 
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B. Maryland Public Housing Law 
The Maryland enabling statute creates in each city of the 
'State a housing authority, but the authority's powers remain 
.dormant until the governing body of the city passes a resolution 
declaring a need for the authority to function in the city,11° Once 
the resolution is passed and the authority begins operation, it pos-
,sesses the powers necessary to effectuate its purposes,111 those pur-
poses being primarily the elimination of slum areas and the con-
;struction of sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low 
income,112 As with the CHA in the Gautreaux decisions, a Mary-
land housing authority may operate in an area extending beyond 
the city's boundaries,11a Before passage of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974,114 Baltimore City's housing au-
thority had never exercised the extraterritorial jurisdiction.ll5 
Although state law grants it authority to operate in Baltimore 
County, federal law requires the city to obtain a consent agreement 
from the county,116 Despite solicitations by Baltimore City, the 
·county has withheld its consent.1l7 
Maryland law also provides that two or more housing author-
ities may join together in the construction and operation of a 
housing project in the area of operation of one of the authorities. us 
Baltimore City has been unable to establish a cooperating arrange-
ment with any of the suburban areas,119 In terms of the metro-
-politan expansion of public housing opportunities, such a joint 
-program is impossible in the absence of willing cooperation of the 
:suburban areas. 
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 4 (1957). 
-111. ld. § 8. 
-112. ld. § 2. 
-113. Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 670, §§ 17(b), 27c (1959) (three mile extra-
territorial jurisdiction), with MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 3(f) (1957) (ten mile 
extra-territorial jurisdiction' excluding other incorporated cities). 
-114. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered 
sections of 12, 15, 20, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.). 
115. See note 146 illira. See also Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, 83-84. 
-116. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970). In Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitall Housing 
Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975), 
the constitutionality of such a consent agreement was upheld. 
117. Embry Interview, supra note 40. With respect to public housing, Baltimore 
County and Baltimore City are adverse parties. The county, having attracted 
middle and upper class whites from the city, has a tax rate which is approxi-
mately half that of the city. It also is able to spend substantially more per pupil 
to educate its school children. Public housing tenants, of course, are tax con-
sumers as opposed to tax payers and would dilute the county's tax base. In 
1970, approximately seventy percent of the public housing tenants in Baltimore 
City were welfare recipients. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 91. 
-118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 11 (1957). 
119. Embry Interview, supra note 40. 
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The State has not contributed in any appreciable degree to the 
solution of the lower-income housing problem which confronts the 
Baltimore metropolitan area.120 In a recent amendment to the 
statute creating the housing authorities, the legislature proclaimed: 
It is hereby found and declared that there exists within 
Baltimore City a critical shortage of decent, safe and sani-
tary dwelling accommodations available either to rent or 
purchase which persons of eligible low income can afford . 
• • • 121 
It is this type of myopia which inhibits metropolitan involvement 
in public housing programs. While persons of low income presently 
are confined primarily to the city, the shortage of affordable hous-
ing for persons of low income extends throughout the metropolitan 
area.122 As acknowledged in the Gautreaux decision, the housing 
options for persons of low income should extend to the entire 
metropolitan area.12S 
IV. THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
ACT OF 1974 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974124 sub-
stantially altered existing public housing and community develop-
ment legislation. As noted in Gautreaux, the flexibility of the 
housing assistance programs spawned by the Act expanded the 
role of HUD in providing lower-income housing opportunities.125 
From the standpoint of metropolitan involvement in the lower-
income housing assistance programs, however, the most innovative 
and far-reaching aspect of the 1974 Act is the connection estab-
lished between the housing programs and the community develop-
ment programs, namely, the housing assistance plan.126 
120. Ide See also Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9. 
121. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 44A, § 8B(a) (Supp.1976). 
122. [T]he impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the central 
city extends beyond the city boundaries to include the surrounding com-
munity. The city and suburbs together make up what I call the "real 
city." To solve the problems of the "real city", only metropolitan-wide 
solutions will do. 
Gautreaux V. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 1975),. 
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hills V. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct 1538 (1976) 
(statement by Secretary Romney). 
123. 96 S. Ct. at 1547. 
124. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered 
sections of 12, IS, 20, 40, 42, 49 U.S.c.) [hereinafter cited as the 1974 Act]. 
125. 96 S. Ct. at 1549. 
126. See Hearings on Implementation of Section 8 and Other Housing Programs 
Before the Subcommittee on Holtsing and Urban Development of the House 
Committee on Banking, Currency and Housillg, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5· 
(1975). See generally City of Hartford V. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn .. 
1976). 
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Each local government making an application for a Community 
Development Block Grant127 must include in its application a hous-
ing assistance plan which (1) accurately surveys the condition of 
'existing housing in the community,128 (2) assesses the housing 
assistance needs of lower-income persons residing or expected to 
reside in the community,129 (3) specifies a realistic annual goal for 
the number of families to be assisted, ISO and (4) indicates the 
general location of proposed housing for lower-income persons.lSl 
This application requirement cannot be waived by HUD.132 The 
potential effect of this requirement from a metropolitan perspective 
is that a suburban community will no longer receive funding for 
community development projects while simultaneously abrogating 
its responsibility for the provision of lower-income housing.13s 
In some metropolitan areas the link established between hous-
ing and community development programs may have a coercive 
effect on suburban areas, requiring them to formulate realistic 
lower-income housing plans to avoid loss of community develop-
ment funding.134 In Baltimore County, the threatened loss of com-
127. Ten existing community development programs administered by HUD were con-
solidated and replaced by the Community Development Block Grant Program. 
See C.F.R. § 570 l(c) (1976). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (a) (4) (A) (Supp. V, 1975). 
129. [d. 
130. !d. § 5304(a)(4)(B). 
131. [d. § 5304(a) (4) (C). 
132. [d. § 5304(b) (3). 
133. See S. REP. No. 93--693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). 
134. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), in which 
the City of Hartford brought suit against HUD and seven suburban towns 
challenging the propriety of HUD's decision to approve community development 
block grant applications submitted by these towns. The gravamen of plaintiff's 
complaint was that HUD had approved these grants without requiring the 
suburban communities to submit realistic estimates of the number of lower-
income persons expected to reside within its borders. Six of the seven towns 
had submitted estimates of zero and the seventh submitted an estimate derived 
from a calculation formula admittedly unacceptable to HUD. Plaintiff argued 
that the approval of these grants, despite submission of patently unrealistic 
"expected to reside" estimates, was tantamount to a de facto waiver of this appli-
cation requirement in contravention of the statute. The District Court found 
that the "expected to reside" figure was "the keystone of the spatial deconcen-
tration objective of the ••• 1974 Act", and held that the approval of these 
deficient grant applications was an abuse of discretion by HUD. Accordingly, 
the funding of these grants was enjoined. 
The importance of the holding in this case is deflated when the basis of 
the "expected to reside" estimate is examined. The "expected to reside" figures 
are estimates of the number of lower-income persons expected to be employed 
in the community as a result of expanding commercial development. 24 C.F.R. 
§ 570, 303(C)(2)(i) (1976). But in a large city such as Baltimore, the strain 
on the treasury and public housing programs is caused by welfare and other 
non-working families. Therefore, even realistic "expected to reside" estimates 
overlook the segment of the population most in need of public housing. Embry 
Interview, supra note 40. 
156 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 6 
munity development funding would not promote low-income hous-
ing programs since the county lacks any community development 
programs.l35 
The housing assistance plan relates to another aspect of the 
1974 Act - Section Slower-income housing assistance programs.136-
The new Section S programs attempt to establish a nexus between 
the public and private markets by making use of the private hous-
ing market and developers in a public housing program through 
three types of assisted housing: existing, substantially rehabili-
tated and new. Currently, only the existing program is being used 
to provide housing for lower-income families. The programs for 
substantially rehabilitated and new housing are devoted almost ex-
clusively to housing for the elderly and handicapped.137 
The Section S existing housing program operates in accordance 
with an annual contributions contract between HUD and the 
PHA.138 Pursuant to this contract, the PHA makes assistance pay-
ments to participating owners of existing units who rent to lower-
income tenants.139 Families wishing to participate in this program 
must first be determined eligible by the PHA and obtain a Certifi-
cate of Family Participation.Ho Thereafter, a certified family is 
responsible for searching the area of operation of the sponsoring 
PHA and finding an existing privately-owned dwelling unit which 
satisfies its needs.HI Once a suitable dwelling unit is found, if the 
owner is willing to participate in the program, a housing assistance 
contract is entered into by the dwelling unit owner and the PHA.142 
The amount of the assistance payment received by the property 
owner equals the difference between the family's contribution (a 
fixed percentage of income) and the gross rent.143 In areas where 
no PHA operates, or where an existing PHA lacks the capability 
to implement the program, HUD possesses the authority to con-
tract directly with the owners.144 
Prior to the 1974 Act, HUD could not make funds available for 
a housing program without the approval of the local government 
of the jurisdiction in which it would be located.145 This remained 
135. League, supra note 5, at VII-I. Baltimore County made an application for a 
Community Development Block Grant in 1975 but was declared ineligible because 
it lacked urban renewal authority. ld. 
136. United States Housing Act of 1937, § 8, 42 U.S.c. § 1437(£) (Supp. V, 1975), 
formerly ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). 
137. Embry Interview, supra note 40. 
138. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.104 (1976). 
139. ld. § 882.105. 
140. ld. § 882.209. 
141. ld. § 882.103. 
142. ld. § 882, app. II. 
143. ld. § 882.114. 
144. 42 U.S.c. § 1437f(b) (1) (Supp. V, 1975). 
145. 42 U.S.c. § 1415(7) (b) (1970). 
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true even when state law provided extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
the PHA sponsoring the program.146 
Although the 1974 Act retained this requirement for conven-
tional public housing,147 all Section 8 programs consisting of more 
than twelve units are now subject to a new procedure embodied 
in Section 213 of the 1974 Act.uS In accordance with this pro-
cedure, the local government may comment about or object to the 
program which is to be located within its boundaries, but it lacks 
any veto power.149 The local government's basis for comment or 
objection is limited to an inconsistency with an approved housing 
assistance plan, if one is in force, and/or a lack of need for public 
housing.150 In either case, HUD makes the final decision on whether 
the inconsistency or need exists.l5l 
One infirmity of the Section 8 program is its reliance upon 
voluntary participation by private owners.152 The paucity of own-
ers in Baltimore County willing to participate in the Section 8 
program inhibits HCD's efforts to utilize its entire area of opera-
tion to spatially deconcentrate public housing.153 Although perhaps 
also motivated by race or economics, the property owner's desire 
to avoid formal contract obligations with HCD constitutes a sig-
nificant factor contributing to owner unwillingness to participate 
in the program.154 
In order to circumvent private owner unwillingness, HCD has 
corresponded with HUD, recommending amendment to the Section 8 
program to allow the PHA to make direct payments to the lower-
income families who lease from the owner.155 If this reform were 
enacted, the lower-income tenant would appear before the land-
lord as any other member of the renting public. The inhibition 
against directly contracting with the HCD would be dispelled since 
146. Baltimore Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, 79-30 (testimony of Robert C. Embry, 
Commissioner, Department of Housing and Community Development). 
147. 42 U.S.c. § 1437c(e) (Supp. V, 1975). "Conventional public housing" means 
the construction and operation of housing projects by the PHA. 
148. ld. § 1439. Programs for twelve (12) or fewer units are exempt from the local 
comment and objection procedures. ld. 
149. ld. § 1439(a). 
150. ld. § 1439(a) (1) (B), (d) (1) (C). 
151. 24 C.F.R. § 882.205 (1976). If an inconsistency with the local housing assist-
ance plan forms the basis of the local government's objection, the importance of 
HUD's initial scrutiny of these plans is emphasized. 
152. See Comment, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 - Who 
Shall Live in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 320, 334 (1976). 
153. Embry Interview, supra note 40. 
154. ld. Presently, a Section 8 program is in force in Baltimore County by which a 
private real estate firm under contract with the State of Maryland performs the 
functions of a PHA. Still in its infancy, this program has already attracted an 
applicant waiting list of over 3,000 persons. League, supra note 5, at I11-6 
and III-7. 
155. Embry Interview, supra note 40. 
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it would not be involved, and any refusal to rent based on race 
could be litigated in a civil rights suit.156 
Another infirmity in the Section 8 program is the limitation 
on the amount of rent payable per unit imposed by HUn's fair 
market value determination.157 This also restricts HCn's efforts 
to recruit participating owners in the county, since the average 
rental of a two-bedroom apartment plus utilities well exceeds the 
figure established by Hun.158 
Even if the infirmities in the Section 8 program were corrected, 
the housing needs of large low-income families would still not be 
met due to the relative scarcity of Baltimore County apartment 
units with more than three bedrooms.l59 
V. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN 
BALTIMORE 
While the vestiges of past discrimination in the city remain, 
segregation, as a policy of the housing authority, has long since 
been abandoned,160 A comparison of the 1970 and 1976 tenant 
composition statistics reveals some progress toward integrating 
the public housing projects.l6l Additionally, Hcn has recently 
opened a large low-rise public housing project located in a racially 
mixed neighborhood in the city,162 With the inception of Section 8 
housing assistance programs, Hcn's extra-territorial area of op-
eration has become functional for the first time. 
The provisions of the Section 8 program, however, impede its 
implementation in Baltimore County. The fair market rent estab-
lished by HUn for the metropolitan area ($201 per month for a 
two-bedroom unit) restricts Hcn's operations in the county,l63 
156. E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.c. § 1982 (1970); The Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), wherein the Court stated: 
On its face, therefore, [42 U.S.c.] § 1982, appears to prohibit all discrimi-
nation against Negroes in the sale or rental of property - discrimination 
by private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities. 
Id. at 421 (emphasis in the original). 
157. For the Baltimore metropolitan area, the fair market value has been set by HUD 
at $201.00. 41 Fed. Reg. 13065 (1976). 
158. Interview with Samuel I. Rosenberg, Section 8 Coordinator, Department of 
Housing and Community Development, in Baltimore, Aug. 10, 1976. 
159. League, supra note 5, at 111-7. 
160. See E. Ash, The Baltimore Story (Dec. 9, 1955). However, the past acts of 
discrimination are still sufficient to invoke judicial relief. See Banks v. Perk, 
341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). 
161. Compare App. A with App. B. 
162. The new project, named Hollander Ridge, consists of approximately 1,000 units 
and is located in northeast Baltimore. 
163. See Hearings on Housing Assistance Payments, Community Developmeat Block 
GraMs and Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans Before the Subcommittee on Hous-
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The additional duties placed on private ownersl64 tend to discourage 
their participation in the program.1611 Until supply exceeds demand 
in the private market, creating a desire in the private owner to 
participate, the Section 8 program in its present structure will 
fail to entice owner participation.166 While Section 8 program 
infirmities will continue to handicap the lower-income housing 
program in the metropolitan area, the primary impediment is the 
failure of Baltimore County to actively participate in the pro-
gram.16T 
If the Gautreaux case is applicable to metropolitan Baltimore, 
HUD must use its best efforts and discretion to expand the honsing 
options of the city's poor.16S Realistically, this means increasing 
the supply of public housing in Baltimore County for persons of 
lower income. This can be achieved by a HUD allocation of funds 
for use by HCD in its extra-territorial area of operation in the 
county,169 or by a HUD by-pass of the PHA through exercise of its 
authority pursuant to Section 8 (b) (1) to deal directly with private 
owners.17° Another alternative, not involving HUD, would be for 
Baltimore County to create a PHA, thereby operating its own 
public housing program.17l 
An inherent problem in using either of the first two alternatives 
is that the Section 8 existing program will not be sufficient due to 
a lack of existing housing.172 Therefore, new construction is re-
quired.11S New construction, however, is not exempt from land 
use controls and hence is vulnerable.174 
In a case pending before the Supreme Court, Village of Arl-
ington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp" m 
ing and Urban Development of the House Committee on Banking, Currency and 
Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29-30 (1975). 
164. ld. These extra duties may range from extra-territorial services and budget 
counselling to the provision of day care centers. 
165. ld. 
166. ld. 
167. See Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified,473 F.2d 910 
(6th Cir. 1973). "No matter how a housing authority may try, their aims and 
goals cannot be met without the support and leadership of the administration 
within the city it attempts to build public housing." !d. at 1179. See also note 31 
supra and accompanying text. 
168. 96 S. Ct. at 1547-48. 
169. ld. at 1548. 
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (b) (1) (Supp. V, 1975). 
171. To date Baltimore County has not created a public housing authority. 
172. Hearings on H.R. 11769 Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community 
Development of the HOltse Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th 
Cong., lst Sess. at 490-91 (1976) (letter from RCDto the Subcommittee). 
173. ld. 
174. Rills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, 
§ 14 (1957). 
175. 517 F2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1976). 
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the use of zoning regulations to prohibit construction of multi-
family lower-income housing in a suburban community is being 
reviewed. In this case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the denial of a zoning change violated the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment due to its discriminatory 
effect. The court ruled that the preservation of property values 
and a zoning plan were not compelling state interests permitting 
the denial of equal protection. In making its decision, the court 
took judicial notice of the Chicago metropolitan area's history 
of segregated housing. The questions presented in the petition for 
certiorari are: 
(1) Does failure to grant rezoning request for multiple 
family housing for low and moderate income families in 
midst of single-family area violate Fourteenth Amendment, 
even though Village was admittedly maintaining integrity 
of its zoning plan and protecting neighborhood property 
values? (2) Does alleged discriminatory housing pattern 
in Chicago metropolitan area impose upon suburban mu-
nicipality affirmative duty to ignore its admittedly proper 
zoning ordinance to permit construction of multi-family 
low and moderate income housing?176 
If the Supreme Court affirms the Seventh Circuit's decision, a 
local government's ability to employ land use controls as a barrier 
to public housing will be diminished. If the Seventh Circuit is 
reversed, and land use controls are permitted to be used in this way, 
Baltimore County could still effectively prevent the construction 
of public housing. ThEm the only viable alternative by which public 
housing could be erected outside the city boundaries would be 
active county participation.177 
The Baltimore metropolitan area needs a "fair share" lower-
income housing plan which would distribute the responsibility for 
the provision of lower-income housing throughout the metropolitan 
area rather than concentrating it in the center city. A proposed 
amendment to Section 213 (d) (1) of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, under consideration by the House Sub-
committee on Housing and Community Development, specifically 
authorizes HUD to make adjustments in the allocation of funds 
as it deems necessary to assist in the implementation of "fair 
share" and other cooperative metropolitan area-wide housing 
-------
176. 441 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 25,1975). 
177. A more drastic alternative would be to completely remove local control from 
the public housing program and legislatively exempt public housing from local 
land use controls. The constitutional issues involved with such a program are 
beyond the scope of this note. 
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plans.178 HUD fully supports this amendmentYo Absent such a 
plan, the city will continue to bear a grossly disproportionate bur-
den in the production and maintenance of lower-income housing 
for the area's indigent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Neither the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
nor the Gautreaux decision have had a substantial impact on the 
housing opportunities of the lower-income blacks residing in Balti-
more City. Indeed, it is questionable whether any legislation or 
court decision is capable of reversing the trend which racially 
divides the Baltimore metropolitan area. The thrust of Gautreaux 
is toward a racially integrated metropolitan area. Baltimore 
County almost completely surrounds the city, luring higher-income 
families away from the city, depleting the city of its economic 
vitality. Paraphrasing Justice Clark's remarks in the Seventh 
Circuit's Gautreaux decision, the absence of low-income housing 
opportunities in a suburban area such as Baltimore County evinces 
"a callousness on the part of [county officials] towards the rights 
of the black, underprivileged citizens of [Baltimore City] that is 
beyond comprehension."18o 
The new federal programs represent an attempt to tailor public 
housing into a form acceptable to middle class communities. Gone 
are the high-rise monuments to ghetto poverty of the 1940's which 
contributed so much to the formulation of negative attitudes to-
wards public housing programs. Lingering, however, are the nega-
tive attitudes. The public for the most part is unaware of the 
"new look" in public housing. 
Unless the Gautreaux decision ignites a new appraisal of metro-
politan housing responsibilities, the future looms bleak. Justice 
Marshall's closing prediction in his Milliken dissent sounds a solemn 
warning: 
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy 
task. Racial attitudes ingrained ... are not easily set aside . 
. . . But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed 
to stand in the way of the rights of others, so public op-
position, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to 
divest this Court from the enforcement of the constitu-
tional principle at issue .... In the short run, it may seem to 
178. Hearings on Oversight of Section 8 Housing Assistance Program Before the 
Subcommittee on Housil~g and Urban Developmmt of the House Committee on 
Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 55 (1975). 
179. Id. 
180. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1975). 
Justice Oark of the United States Supreme Court, retired, was sitting by 
designation. 
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be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas 
to be divided up each into two cities - one white, the 
other black - but it is a course, I predict, our people will 
ultimately regret. lSI 
John Weld 
ADDENDUM 
Since the initial printing of this article, the United States 
Supreme Court filed its opinion in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S. 
Jan. 11, 1977), discussed in Section V supra, reversing the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court of ap-
peals held that in the absence of compelling state interests, the Vill-
age's refusal to rezone violated the equal protection clause because 
of its racially discriminatory effect. The Supreme Court, however, 
reiterated that racially disproportionate impact alone is insufficient 
to show a denial of equal protection. The Court reaffirmed that 
the plaintiff must prove that the challenged action was motivated. 
by a discriminatry purpose. The reversal in this case was predi-
cated upon a finding that the plaintiffs had not sustained their 
burden of proof. 
The imposition of such a stringent standard of proof will in-
sulate an increased number of exclusionary zoning regulations from 
the reach of the fourteenth amendment. Suburban communities 
which have historically and consistently zoned to exclude lower-
income families will be able to justify on nonracial grounds zoning 
decisions which have a racially disproportionate impact. The net 
result of the Court's decision is the perpetuation of racial isolation 
of suburban communities. 
181. 413 U.S. at 814-15. 
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APPENDIX A 
(1970) 
Project Census Tract Population Population Population Population 
% NOllwhite White Nonwhite Total Total 
Latrobe 93.8 72 1979 2051 96.5% 
McCulloh 
----
98.7 0 1027 1027 100 % 
Poe _____ 98.4 0 700 700 100 0/0 
Douglass _ 64.9 0 974 974 100 % 
Perkins 
---
68.2 239 1732 1971 87.9% 
Gilmor ________ 99.6 0 1562 1562 100 % 
O'Donnell __ 6.8 2483 669 3152 21.2% 
Somerset __ 9.5 0 1571 1571 100 % 
Cherry Hill_ 99.6 0 2662 2662 100 % 
Cherry Hill 
Ext. 1 ___ 99.6 0 3154 3154 100 % 
Cherry Hill 
Ext. 2 ______ 99.6 0 1546 1546 100 % 
Claremont _ 19.5 949 252 1201 21.1% 
Lafayette __ 98.5 0 3442 3442 100 % 
Flag House_ 65.5 52 1900 1952 97.3% 
Lexington 
Terrace __ 87.1 0 2634 2634 100 % 
Murphy Homes 99.3 0 2883 2883 100 % 
Westport Ext. 97.9 0 1177 1177 100 % 
Fairfield 
-
80.4 0 1112 1112 100 % 
Brooklyn __ 1.6 1529 129 1658 7.8% 
'Westport 1_ 97.9 0 772 772 100 % 
Oswego MalL 94.2 0 241 241 100 % 
Lakeview 
Lowers 
--
83.7 26 170 196 86.7% 
5,350 32,288 37,638 
Source: Planning Division, Research & Analysis Section, Department of Housing 
and Community Development. (Percent calculations by the author.) 
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APPENDIX B 
(1976) 
p,.oject Population Population Population Population 
White Nonwhite Total Total 
Latrobe 33 1823 1861 98.2% 
McCulloh 9 930 939 99.0% 
McCulloh Ext. _______ 5 1266 1271 99.6% 
Poe 
-----._-- 4 611 615 99.3% 
Douglass 
-----
5 902 907 99.4% 
Perkins _____ 98 1774 1872 94.8% 
Gilmor 3 1371 1374 99.9% 
O'Donnell 
------
2204 792 2996 26.4% 
Somerset 8 1349 1357 99.4% 
Cherry HilL _____ 4 2399 2403 99.8% 
Cherry Hill Ext. 1 __ 13 2795 2808 99.5% 
Cherry Hill Ext. 2 ____ 6 1363 1369 99.6% 
Claremont 
------
775 330 1105 29.9% 
• Claremont Ext. ____ 146 35 181 19.3% 
Lafayette 20 3036 3056 99.3% 
Flag House ______ 19 1733 1752 98.9% 
Lexington 3 2424 2427 99.9% 
Murphy 14 2617 2631 99.5% 
Westport Ext._ 7 1028 1035 99.3% 
Fairfield ______ 6 1025 1031 99.4% 
Brooklyn ____ 1317 275 1592 17.3% 
Westport 
-------
0 657 657 100.0% 
Broadway _____ 61 888 949 93.6% 
• West Twenty ______ 95 383 478 80.1% Mt. Winans _______ 0 731 731 100.0% 
Oswego 0 211 211 100.0% 
• Lakeview _____ 9 178 187 95.2% 
• Bel ParL _____ 35 299 334 89.5% 
• Govans Manor _____ 177 72 249 28.9% Somerset Ext. _______ 5 312 317 98.4% 
• Wyman House ______ 113 89 202 44.01% Rosedale _________ 0 461 461 100.0% 
Other (Scattered) ____ 156 6072 6228 97.5% 
Total __ 5,350 40,236 45,586 88.3% 
• Indicates public housing projects limited to the elderly and handicapped. 
Source: Planning Division, Research & Analysis Section, Department of Housing 
and Community Development. (Percent calculations by the author.) 
